The Ontology of Many-Worlds: Modality and Time Essays -- Compare Contr

The Ontology of Many-Worlds: Modality and Time ABSTRACT: There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is not for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmomen t identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space. Introduction There are two kinds of theories of many-worlds; the one is modal and the other temporal. The former regards the reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter as consisting of many momentary worlds, which usually are called 'moments'. (1) In this paper I make a comparison between modal and temporal theories of many-worlds, especially paying attention to the concept of transworld identity and so making a comparison between trans-possible-world identity and trans-momentary-world identity (or trans-moment identity abbreviately). (2... ... for the present argument. (5) Kaplan's theory of direct reference does not necessarily presuppose the ontology of many-worlds. So my critcism is not directed for his theory itself but for its application to the ontological explanation of trans-moment identity. (6) This sentence is a slight modification of the example which Kaplan himself used. (Kaplan, D., 1989, p. 577, n.21) References (Kaplan, D., 1977) "Demonseratives", in Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J. etc. ed., Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.481-563. (Kaplan, D., 1989) "Afterthoughts", in Themes from Kaplan,pp.565-614. (Kripke, S.,1980) Naming and Necessity (2nd ed.), Basil Blackwell. (Lewis, D., 1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell. (McCall, S., 1994) A Model of the Universe, Oxford University Press. (McTaggart, J., 1908) "The Unreality of Time", Mind 18, pp.457-484.